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ABSTRACT 
This study examines Beijing’s urban development in the last 40 years, investigating how planning 
influence the forming of new centers. Beijing’s historic structures corroborate a large and single 
center wherefrom built-up areas sprawl. Planning authorities strived to contain sprawl by 
proposing multi-cluster and polycentric structures. In terms of built-up land control, after initial 
sprawl in the 1980s and 1990s, the 2004 planning was effective, creating fringe clusters or 
satellite towns while preserving green partitions between them. But in terms of economic activities, 
planning has been less successful in that the economic active zones, have often not exceeded the 
scope of the central cluster. We define this phenomenon the “dual expansion”—the expansion of 
built-up areas that is more malleable to planning efforts, versus the slower and more spontaneous 
expansion in economic activities that adheres to a much more centralized path. The study suggests 
that urban planning should be the planning of a spatio-socio-economical system rather than merely 
of land-use. This provides insights for future planners who would like to cultivate polycentric urban 
structures. Keywords: urban morphology, urban sprawl, planning, urban centers, polycentric 
structure. 
INTRODUCTION  
Beijing is China’s capital and second largest metropolis boasting over 3,000 years of history. Its 
current urban form is founded on Yuan Dynasty’s capital in the 13th century, and later Ming 
Dynasty’s capital in the 15th century. After the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, Beijing 
became the capital and underwent several rounds of planning. Built-up areas swelled, especially 
after the Reform and Opening-up in 1978 that brought rapid economic growth. One feature of 
Beijing’s post-reform expansion is sprawl, and at the same time, planning authorities’ onslaught 
against sprawl by proposing multi-cluster and polycentric structures. Although planning exerts much 
influence in Beijing than in cities of other countries that are more laissez-faire, the success of such 
efforts is limited. Following completion of the first ring road along former city walls (Figure 1), 
Beijing constructed a total of five concentric ring roads extending 30 kilometers of radius. 
Candidate sub-centers did not develop to expectations. Economic functions still converge in central 
areas, and commuting to and from the center is onerous (Jiang and Levinson, 2017). 
The theory of the polycentric city has a long history and has been preferred in planning practice for 
metropolises (Harris and Ullmann, 1945; Krugman, 1996). London, Paris, and Tokyo all attempted 
to contain urban sprawl by transforming to polycentric structures. From 1946 to 1950, eight “New 
Towns” were constructed around London. In 1965, Paris proposed an auxiliary center separate 
from the existing one (Lacour and Delamarre, 2008). The Tokyo 1992 master planning also 
proposed a polycentric framework (Sorensen, 2005). Yet these attempts have not all been 
successful. Halbert (2006) claimed that Paris has been a polycentric city region “that never was”. 
Tokyo’s spontaneous urban growth persistently exceeds planned boundaries, forming gigantic uni-
centric urban agglomeration that engulfs planned clusters and the partitions in between. In Beijing’s 
case, the polycentric structure has taken shape to some extent, but the problem of over-
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concentration of businesses is still firm (Wu and Li, 2017). Yang and Yang (2016) claimed that 
planning efforts towards polycentric structures has produced minimized optimization effects, and 
that we should turn from the polycentric structure to the “primary-and-auxiliary-centers” structure. 
Our study, then, focuses on Beijing’s built-up land development and the cultivation of “new centers” 
in the past 40 years of the post-reform era, investigating how planning efforts might influence the 
forming of sub-centers. Beijing’s case is unique, because it is both a major world metropolis, and a 
city whereon planning supposedly exerts much power. For convenience, we here define “urban 
centers” as locations in the city that are locally denser than surroundings in terms of economic 
activities. In addition to analyzing historic forms and planning schemes, we examine the possible 
inconsistency between the mere expansion of built-up land and the perfusion of economic activities. 
Our spatial scope includes central Beijing and its directly approximate suburbs—namely, 12 out of 
16 administrative districts of Beijing, excluding the distant four districts. 
BACKGROUND  
The site of Beijing’s current center was established in Yuan Dynasty in the 13th century. In the Ming 
Dynasty (14—17th centuries), the fabric of Beijing’s historic core took shape, including the iconic 
alignment of the city wall, which today became the inner-most ring road as shown in Figure 1. 
Because the large imperial palace and the central government (forming the Huangcheng, literally 
“Imperial City”) occupied a large area in the center, economic activities had to circumvent it, 
forming economic nuclei in an annular manner around Huangcheng as well as attaching to city 
gates (Hou, 2013). Early 20th century construction did not alter this structure fundamentally except 
for a few new districts. Today, the annular zone around close to the innermost ring road (former 
city wall) remain the metropolis’s core areas. Put in metropolitan scale, this unconcentrated and 
annular distribution of economic nuclei across relatively large central areas deters polycentric 
development, because sub-centers can hardly compete with the existing center agglomeration. 
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Since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, Beijing underwent seven rounds of planning. 
The 1953 planning scheme located central governments in the urban center, and adopted annular 
and radial road systems, which was a Soviet influence. The 1957-58 schemes were much more 
decentralized, although they were not implemented. After that, the planning bureau was canceled 
until its recovery in the 1970s (Xue and Liu, 2014). The 1978 Reform and Opening-up brought 
rapid economic growth and expansion of built-up land. The 1982 master planning did not pay 
much attention on issues of urban sprawl or polycentric structures (Beijing Municipality Urban 
Planning Committee, 1982). Economic growth, especially since the marketization of urban land in 
the 1990s accelerated urban sprawl. To reduce sprawl, the 1992 master planning for the first time 
proposed a multi-cluster and polycentric structure (Beijing Municipality Urban Planning Committee, 
1992). It introduced 10 “fringe clusters” and 14 “satellite towns” as candidate new centers, as well 
as green partition between them (Figure 1). According to planning, new developments should be 
diverted from the central cluster to these new clusters. The 2004 master planning inherited the multi-
cluster scheme, proposing fringe clusters and “New Towns”, each with a specific function (Beijing 
Municipality Urban Planning Committee, 2006). The fringe clusters and “New Towns” 
corresponded for the most part with those proposed in the 1992 planning. Most recently, the 2016 
master planning revised the original polycentric scheme by proposing Tongzhou as the auxiliary 
municipal administration center, above other centers (Beijing Municipality Urban Planning 
Committee, 2017). The effects of this planning scheme remain to be shown. 
We might conclude that Beijing’s historic form brought the tendency towards a unicentric structure, 
which then brought the tendency of sprawl in rapid economic development. Meanwhile, planning 
efforts have strived to contain sprawl by proposing multi-cluster and polycentric structures. In the 
section that follows, we use RS images, census data and POI’s to investigate in what way and to 
what extent sprawl has been contained and new sub-centers have been cultivated. 
Figure 1 Diagram of Beijing’s urban form and the proposed sub-centers of planning schemes 
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FINDINGS  
In terms of built-up areas, Beijing’s expansion before 2004 was primarily the sprawl of the central 
cluster; yet since 2004, relatively independent fringe clusters have been developed in consistence 
with planning. We extracted built-up areas from unbuilt land using supervised classification of 
remote sensing imagery (Forget et al., 2018). We acquired a series of LandSat RS images of 
metropolitan Beijing ranging from 1980 to 2019 and employed supervised classification to divide 
the land on each image into parcels of six types: urban built-up land, villages, unbuilt land, crop 
fields, water, and forests. To acquire smoother boundaries of urban built-up land, we divided 
metropolitan Beijing by 30 m * 30 m grid cells, and calculated the local built-up density—
proportion of land that had been classified as urban built-up land within 1 km radius—of each grid 
cell. We define urban built-up areas as the agglomeration of all the cells whose local built-up 
density exceeds 70%.  
Figure 2 shows the identified urban built-up areas of Beijing between 1980 and 2019. From 1980 
to 2004, the primary form of built-up area expansion was the sprawl of the central cluster, with one 
exception of Jiuxianqiao in the northeast. Although the master planning of 1991 planned several 
“satellite towns”, such development did not happen unless there already existed such a town. 
However, from 2004 on, the development of relatively independent fringe clusters became an 
important form of expansion, besides the sprawl of the central cluster. The developed fringe clusters 
were largely consistent with the 2004 master planning. The partition between planned fringe 
clusters was largely remained, too. We may conclude that the 2004 planning was effective in 
directing the conversion (or non-conversion) from unbuilt to built-up land in metropolitan Beijing.  
However, in terms of diverting economic activities from core areas to fringe clusters (candidate new 
centers), planning was not as successful. We employed two datasets to depict the relative intensity 
of economic activities in different years from 1980 to 2019. One of them is the Third National 
Economic Census of 2008, which records every existing economic unit at the time of survey, 
including the type, founding time, address, staff size, etc. thereof. The relative economic scale of 
location A as of year B is defined as the economic scale of location A as of year B in relation to the 
Figure 2 Constructed land development of Beijing 1980-2019 Figure 3 Density of economic activities and their ratios to built-up land area of Beijing 1979-2019 
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total scale as of year B. This ratio is approximated as the remaining economic scale of location A 
as of year B until census time (2008) in relation to the remaining total scale as of year B until 2008; 
which is, operationally, the staff size of all economic units of location A that were founded before 
year B in relation to the total staff size of economic units founded before year B. Because changes 
are more frequent in economically active places, this approximation may underestimate the 
economic importance in of economically active (central) places of the past, and the more remote 
the year, the more significant the bias. For 2019, we employed another dataset of POI’s within 
metropolitan Beijing from Baidu map, a major digital map provider in China, and excluded the 
POI’s that are pure geographic labels such as road names. The relative economic scale of location 
A is calculated by the number of POI’s of location A in relation to the total number of POI’s.  
The results are shown in Figure 3 (a). We found that the economically active locations before the 
21st century was highly concentrated in core areas—even though their relative economic densities 
were underestimated. Since the start of the 21st century, the more economically active areas 
dispersed and gradually perfused to the extent of the central cluster, creating highly dense centers 
within it—the most prominent two being Zhongguancun in the northwest where academic institutions 
and high-tech companies converge, and the central business district in the east. However, the 
planned sub-centers—fringe clusters and satellite towns—did not obtain transfers of economic 
importance.  
To incorporate the inconsistency between the perfusion of economic activities and built-up land 
growth, we calculated the ratio of the relative economic scale to built-up land area of each Jiedao 
(smallest administrative unit) as shown in Figure 3 (b). The Jiedaos outside the central cluster have 
generally witnessed declines of this ratio rather than increases, including those proposed to be sub-
centers. In Figure 4, we summarized whether the planned fringe clusters and satellite towns have 
witnessed increases in economic scales as planned. We analyze whether their densities of 
economic activities, namely, the relative economic scale in relation to built-up land area exceeds 
1/4 standard deviation above average in different years. We found that most except a limited 
number of candidate sub-centers have succeeded to assume greater economic importance. 
Shijingshan, which was already economic local center in the 1980s and a planned center, have 
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been persistently weakening in relative economic scales, until it ceased to be a center. The 
relatively successful ones are: Qinghe, with newly developed high-tech or IT businesses; 
Jiuxianqiao, with newly developed commercial businesses; Shunyi, with airport and newly 
developed commercial and logistic businesses; and most recently, Tongzhou, the proposed 
municipal administration center above other centers. 
Fringe clusters Ratio of economic scale to built-up land 
area > +0.25 St. Dev. above average?  
Satellite /new towns Ratio of economic scale to built-up 
land area > +0.25 St. Dev. above 
average? 
1989 1999 2008 2019 1989 1999 2008 2019 
Qinghe No No Yes Yes Tongzhou No No No Yes 
Beiyuan No No No No Yizhuang No Yes Yes No 
Jiuxianqiao Yes No Yes Yes Huangcun No No No No 
Dongba No No No No Fangshan (Fangshan 
& Liangxiang)* 
No No No No 
Dingfuzhuang No No No No Changxindian** No No No No 
Fatou No No No No Mentougou No No No No 
Nanyuan No No No No Shahe** No No No No 
Fengtai No No No No Changping No No No No 
Shijingshan Yes Yes Yes No Shunyi No No Yes Yes 
Xiyuan No No No No      
* In the 1991 planning this area was defined as two separate clusters—Fangshan and Liangxiang, and in the 2004 only 
Fangshan. 
** Defined as satellite town in the 1991 planning but not in the 2004 planning. 
Figure 4 Economic scale in relation to built-up land area of the proposed new sub-centers of Beijing 1989-2019 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines Beijing’s urban development in the last 40 years, investigating how planning 
efforts might influence the forming of new centers. Beijing’s historic structures corroborate a large 
and single center wherefrom built-up areas sprawl. Planning efforts have strived to contain sprawl 
by proposing multi-cluster and polycentric structures. Our study found that, after initial sprawl in the 
1980s and 1990s, the 2004 planning was effective in built-up (or unbuilt) land control. The 
development of fringe clusters or satellite towns and the preservation of green partitions have been 
largely consistent with planning. However, planning was not as successful in terms of diverting 
economic activities from core areas to fringe clusters. The economically active zones did extend, 
from a few nuclei to larger areas. But they generally did not exceed the scope of central cluster 
(with exceptions). We define this phenomenon as the “dual expansion” (Figure 5)—i.e. on the one 
hand, built-up land expansion which is more malleable to powerful planning schemes, and on the 
other, the slower and more spontaneous perfusion of economic activities that adheres to a much 
more centralized path. 
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As practical implications for planners who would like to cultivate polycentric structures, our study 
suggests that urban planning should be the planning of a system that at least incorporates 
economic activities, rather than mere spatial matter (land-use)—the few successfully cultivated 
centers possess strong predominant functions, i.e. technology, commerce, or high-level 
administration, while the failed ones usually do not.  
In Beijing’s case, since the 1990s, two sets of administration have been responsible for spatial 
planning: the national land administration set the line for the amount of annual increment of built-up 
land, controlled and sold development rights; and the construction administration, which drew up 
urban planning, controls land-use via issuing development permits. Both control by land-use more 
than other aspects, which is possibly why they failed to cultivate economically vibrant centers. The 
“dual expansion” is the result of such unbalanced focus. 
Since 2016, spatial planning administration has been undergoing reforms that merge the two sets 
of administration into a grand “national space” administration, but still separate from the economy 
administrations. It is questionable how the new planning administration scheme might balance the 
excessive focus on land-use. At the same time, Beijing’s latest 2016 planning scheme evolved from 
the “polycentric” model to the “primary-and-auxiliary-centers” model, denoting Tongzhou as the 
municipal administrative center above other centers. The injection of administrative function has 
been put in force, and it remains to be seen whether this round of center-making will prevail. 
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